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Labor Contracts as Partial Gift Exchange

The Quarterly Journal of Economics · 1982 · Vol. 97(4) · pp. 543–543
George A. Akerlof

Abstract

This paper explains involuntary unemployment in terms of the response of firms to workers' group behavior. Workers' effort depends upon the norms determining a fair day's work. In order to affect those norms, firms may pay more than the market-clearing wage. Industries that pay consistently more than the market-clearing wage are primary, and those that pay only the market-clearing wage are secondary. Thus, this paper also gives a theory for division of labor markets between primary and secondary.

Labor market dynamics and wage inequalityEconomic theories and modelsPolitical Economy and MarxismClearingEconomicsWageLabour economicsMarket clearingUnemploymentInvoluntary unemploymentOrder (exchange)Efficiency wageDivision of labour
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References
The Gift: Forms and Functions of Exchange in Archaic Societies.
American Sociological Review · 1956 · 4,109 citations
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