Analysing different payment methods in multi-unit auctions: An empirical evidence from Delhi NCR India

Abstract

This paper aims to provide empirical evidence for the revenue ranking between discriminatory and uniform price auctions by analysing the market for fractional real estate investment. Additionally, it endeavours to reveals the fact related to quantity of biding under discriminatory and uniform price auction based on the primary data of Delhi-NCR. The empirical outcome reveals that we can discard the assumption of equality average quantity of bidding under the discriminatory and the uniform price auction. Additionally, our result clearly reveals that investors do react differently under discriminatory and the uniform price auction, hence it can be surmised that nature of price auction does have significant impact on the average quantity of bidding. On the other hand, the outcomes of F test reveal that variability in biding quantity under two price schemes are dissimilar. Finally, our result exhibit that revenue generated under the uniform price auction is higher then the discriminatory price auction, hence revenue maximization firms should rely on the uniform price auction.