Sources of the continued influence effect: When misinformation in memory affects later inferences.

Abstract

Several lines of research have found that information previously encoded into memory can influence inferences and judgments, even when more recent information discredits it. Previous theories have attributed this to difficulties in editing memory—failing to successfully trace out and alter inferences or explanations generated before a correction. However, in Experiments 1A and IB, Ss who had received an immediate correction made as many inferences based on misinformation as Ss who had received the correction later in the account (and presumably had made more inferences requiring editing.) In a 2nd experiment, the availability (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973) of the misinformation within the comprehension context was tested. The results showed that Ss continued to make inferences involving discredited information when it afforded causal structure, but not when only incidentally mentioned or primed during an intervening task. Experiments 3A and 3B found that providing a plausible causal alternative, rather than simply negating misinformation, mitigated the effect. The findings suggest that misinformation can still influence inferences one generates after a correction has occurred; however, providing an alternative that replaces the causal structure it affords can reduce the effects of misinformation.